Analysis and Modeling of Corruption among Entrepreneurs

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DOI:

https://doi.org/10.5377/reice.v8i16.10699

Keywords:

Corruption, Social Psychology, Behaviour, Descriptive Norms, John Nash Equilibrium

Abstract

Bribery may eradicate social welfare. In the current research, we inspected the mechanism of bribery behaviour based on the (NASH Theory or Non-Cooperative static game theory) which stated by John Forbes Nash Jr. in 1978. With the general hypothesis of “Rational Player,” two bimatrix game models are settled to evaluate the briber and the bribee strategy choice. After discussing the cost-benefit of the (Participants or players), some useful conclusions and dissolve analysis are drawn out. The current study provides three novel experiments that put both metaphors to the test. Overall, a little quantitative study has investigated sequential unethical behaviour. Insomuch prior studies focus on third-party observers’ acceptance of continuous vs. abrupt immoral acts, or the role of self-control and ethical disengagement in the slippery slope of lesser cheating acts empirical investigation contrasting ongoing to the abrupt occurrence of corruption is missing altogether. Recent advances in empirical corruption studies methodology allow the first examination of these different procedures while preserving the economic costs and benefits constant. In the current study, we used a recently improved corruption game by [Köbis, van Prooijen, Righetti, Van Lange, 2015].

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Published

2020-12-29

How to Cite

Xiaohu, Z., Heydari, M., Keung Lai, K., & Yuxi, Z. (2020). Analysis and Modeling of Corruption among Entrepreneurs. Revista Electrónica De Investigación En Ciencias Económicas, 8(16), 262–311. https://doi.org/10.5377/reice.v8i16.10699

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Section

Research Articles